Why Spy: Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty

Author - Frederick Hitz ... [Goo?] [Posters]

This Hardcover Book item from Thomas Dunne Books was reviewed on 4-Nov-2008.

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1) Hardcover Book Why Spy: Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty by Thomas Dunne Books. Reading this book I was reminded of the scene in A Bridge To Far where the Polish commander was staring at Boy Browning. When asked why he was staring, he replied, "I´m trying to figure out whether you´re on our side or theirs" (or something to that effect.) That´s my take on author Frederick Hitz.

Supposedly he spent six years as an "operations officer" (note he doesn´t say "case officer", a position he calls "spy runner") from 1967 to 1973 and may have spent the entire time in Langley. The rest of his CIA time was definitely spent at Langley, from 1978 to 1982, first as legislative counsel (lawyer) to the DCI, and then as deputy chief of the Europe division in the directorate of operations, and from 1990 to 1998 as the Inspector General of the CIA. In between he spent time in the Departments of State, Defense and Energy, and obviously was an accomplished Washington bureaucrat.

Hitz´s understanding of the motivations of spies was only partially correct, but at any rate the discourse over his "seven motivations for espionage" takes up 73 pages of his small (5x7") 196 page book and is only somewhat relevant to the remainder of the book. His other book, "The Great Game" was equally small, suggesting that the author has little to say while maximizing profit. Evidently he used a research assistant to pull together the information of the espionage cases he cites, a somewhat startling admission for someone who is a supposed "expert in espionage" and should have been able to discuss the cases from his active knowledge.

Author Hitz discusses the decline and fall of the CIA´s competence which he believes started in the 1980s in Part Two. Frankly, I believe the decline set in much earlier following the Bay of Pigs, making the "good old days" not the 60s (or late 60s) as the author says, but the 50s. I say this to point out that the author probably never experienced espionage activities conducted without substantial bureaucratic interference, poor tradecraft, and arbitrary requirements and management decisions.

In his Part Two discussion he makes many errors such as calling Pearl Harbor a comparable intelligence surprise to 9-11. Obviously he did not research the Pearl Harbor situation to exhaustion but rather relied on Judge Posner´s opinion. In addition he states, "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the IC (Intelligence Community), and particularly the CIA, were unfairly made the sacrificial lambs for much of the inadequacies of the US Government in preventing 9/11." My response in the margin was to write, "Poor Babies!" Perhaps the guilty party who didn´t receive 50 billion a year (now 80) for his existence was some poor rancher raising beef cattle in the Midwest.

Hitz recounts his shock in returning to Langley in 1990 and finding a Department of Agriculture-like bureaucracy fully intrenched at the CIA instead of the nimble, mission-dedicated organization he had convinced himself was present in 1967. His discovery was correct, but he doesn´t tell the reader how or why the Agency morphed into a useless bureaucracy. Perhaps he doesn´t really know. He blames this on bureaucratic overlay and risk aversion within the Agency. Duh! That is the nature of bureaucracies. But why did the bureaucracy grow unchecked, and why did the avoidance of risk (flaps) become the daily mantra? Here Hitz shows that he was part of the problem.

He states; "... increased accountability to Congress and the executive led to the introduction of more process, and more consultation with the agency´s lawyers (like him)... In my judgment, this was all to the good if the kibitzing was proactive and designed to make the operation more effective as well as legal." Amazing! More legal? Only a lawyer could have said that. Espionage operations are NEVER legal! Outsiders essentially NEVER contribute anything worthwhile to an operation -- by the very nature of oversight an operation is burdened with more process, paperwork and more individuals to satisfy. Here, Hitz is clearly part of the problem along with the rest of the elite, liberal Ivy Leaguers (like Hitz) and lawyers so loved by Agency recruiters.

On page 121, Hitz solidified his argument; "Increased congressional and executive branch oversight of the spies has made for better and more confident espionage rather than the other way around." Yep, and I suppose Rumsfeld´s micro-managing of the Department of Defence or Bobby Kennedy´s micro managing of the CIA really improved operations. More oversight means more risk aversion and more layers of supervision (e.g. more bureaucracy.) Somehow Hitz misses the point entirely.

Part Three discusses spying in the 21st century, and here Hitz continually stresses abiding by the law. He simply can´t come to grips with the idea that spying is a dirty business conducted outside the law. Again he stresses the need for more oversight, then goes on to recommend the elimination of secret prisons (like we had in World War II), and that US spy agencies should NEVER violate US or INTERNATIONAL law.

Throughout the book Hitz talks about CIA spy runners operating under diplomatic cover (e.g. in consulates and embassies), but in Chapter 13 he suddenly makes a plea for more case officers operating under non-official cover (NOC). These individuals must be very self-reliant, non-family oriented, and ready risk-takers, exactly the qualities a bureaucracy attempts to eliminate. Ergo, these individuals are doomed in a bureaucracy like Hitz´s CIA. So the author wants his cake and eat it too. Hitz also states that "It has always shocked my conscience that ... the (CIA) did not learn its lesson..." Really? The word "conscience" is truly out of place here in a discussion of intelligence operations.

In the conclusion in Part Four Hitz stresses the need for language competent, highly trained and motivated case officers in the Agency. Foreign language competence are the top nine qualities needed in a case officer; motivation, self-reliance, risk-taking ability and home office political abilities being the others. With language competence comes cultural understanding, and cultural understanding does not come without language competence.

More than 50% of the CIA´s personnel are recruits since 9/11, and one can only imagine the confusion this causes in a hidebound bureaucracy. That empires are building goes without saying, particularly now that most espionage is now being conducted by outside and independent contractors. Hitz whines that lawyers are not to blame and are valuable for the sensitivity they bring to issues of process and propriety. What about issues of getting the job done? Again, stare at him hard. And now he doesn´t want the Agency to move until it has figured out what to do with its new recruits (page 185).

Some Americans DO know a lot about spying, contrary to the author´s assertion, and there are solutions to our intelligence debacle. Unfortunately, the author doesn´t know any of them. The first step in solving a problem it to acknowledge there is one. Hitz intuitively grasps there is one, but fails to recognize that he is it. Like Pogo, he needs to know, "We have met the enemy and he are us."

The author writes fairly well (after all he is well-educated Ivy League lawyer), but uses a chatty, condescending style. The author´s recommendations are 100% targetted towards improving intelligence gathering against Islamic terrorists, and stresses the need for Arabic linguists. This is myopic and totally misses the 500 pound gorilla in the living room called China that is rapidly gaining economic control of our country through its purchase of US government debt. He also apparently doesn´t know that the largest Islamic country (Indonesia) doesn´t speak Arabic, nor do Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and others.

I do not recommend this book. If the reader wants better information, read "The Human Factor" by Ishmael Jones, or any of Robert Steele´s fine books. Steele also includes a number of excellent references for further study in his reviews.

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2) Hardcover Book Why Spy: Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty by Thomas Dunne Books. This book provides a remarkably informed discussion of intelligence operations at CIA. Its author Fredrick P. Hitz was Inspector General (IG) at CIA from 1990-1998, a position that would certainly give him a different view of the agency. Some years prior to that he was a legal counsel at CIA. In short, this book represents a lawyer´s eye view of CIA and its role in the U.S. intelligence system.

First Hitz makes an important distinction between "intelligence", which he sees as the end product of CIA and "espionage" which he defines as gathering information from human sources (agents) by what he refers to as agent runners or handlers or, as CIA prefers, intelligence officers. He correctly sees intelligence products as the result of analysis and collation of pieces of information acquired through espionage, technical means, or open sources. Indeed unique among most writers on intelligence issues, Hitz offers that open source information contributes a whooping 95 per cent of most intelligence questions and that secret sources contribute only about 5 per cent. This is a startling claim, but most objective evidence appears to bear it out. (See particularly the books of Robert D. Steele). Yet Hitz also makes clear that secret intelligence is often the vital ingredient that makes an intelligent product truly useful to policy makers and warfighters.

Hitz covers a broad set of subjects in this book from his perceptions of why people will become spies (i.e. espionage agents) to questions of analytic tradecraft and CIA management. Rather interestingly, during his tenure as CIA IG he notes the precipitous decline CIA´s ability to engage in espionage that was commented on by such former intelligence officers Robert Baer and the pseudonymous Ishmael Jones. Like them he attributes this to the culture of risk avoidance that plagues CIA to this day and to the loss of experienced intelligence officers. He also observes that the CIA Directors during his tenure were ineffective and often clueless. His views on post 9/11 intelligence developments and attempted reforms are both balanced and well thought out. He has some particularly cogent ideas about such things as the Patriot Act and domestic spying in any form. In his discussion of intelligence reform, Hitz tends to be cautious and avoids sweeping ideas on changing the U.S. Intelligence System. Finally, a warning to readers who tend to view any book on government through partisan spectacles, Hitz did not write this book as a critique of the administration of any president. The book is a discussion of how a lawyer who was on the inside views the processes of the U.S. Intelligence System. As such it is an indispensible guide to how the espionage portion of the intelligence system really works.


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3) Hardcover Book Why Spy: Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty by Thomas Dunne Books. Well written take on what was done and why, what needs doing, and where to begin doing it. Informed look at the ins and outs of our current situation, and the players.¤

4) Hardcover Book Why Spy: Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty by Thomas Dunne Books. In a lucid, fast-reading account, Fred Hitz expertly takes us through the reasons for espionage and a brief history from Judas Iscariot and Nathan Hale to Aldrich Ames and Al Queda. He then runs us smack into the conundrums presented by the 21st Century, with its stateless enemies, its unstructured and viral threats, and its murky challenges. He ends with the eponymous question, Why spy? Read this book, whether casually or carefully, and you will have bracing and thoughtful answers, and perhaps some questions left over.¤

5) Hardcover Book Why Spy: Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty by Thomas Dunne Books.

Page Updated: Robert N. Goolsby, 2-Dec-2008, 03123560489780312356040, 480-810-010-480-050-111-211-8

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