On 2009-07-31 Guillermo Maynez, Mexico, Distrito Federal Mexico wrote: This is the great founding book in systematic and specific study of institutions as a determinant factor in the economic performance of a nation (or any other kind of polity). The author is a Nobel prize winner, and his book is characterized by an economy of words, as well as precission and clarity in his thought. Although it would seem obvious that institutions play a decisive role in economic performance, it hasn´t been the case along the history of economic thinking. North begins by criticizing the cold and abstract Neo-Classical model, a la Robert Solow. Yes in fact, output is the result of the conjunction between capital and labor, plus the further addition of knowledge (technology) to the equation Q = K x L x (e). But this model is really effective only under the assumption of open and competitive markets, perfect and equally accessible information, and zero transaction costs. We know the real world is not like that. We now know also that ´rational choice behavior´ is neither absolute nor unanimous, and that each ´actor´ defines the ´rationality´ of his choices according to his view of the world and himself.
There are two kinds of institutions: formal (laws, codes, public policy, business policy, etc.), and informal (traditons, religions, modes of organization, family and social habits). Both are equally important, for they determine the rules of the game. In turn, rules determine what kind of knowledge is worth acquiring, what activities are profitable, and how to relate to others, which, in turn, determines economic performance. An innovation-rewarding society will tend to be technologically advanced, whereas a conformity-rewarding society will stagnate. Another important statement of the book is that institutions change in a marginal and incremental way. Even after revolutions and radical changes in political regimes, informal institutions tend to persist and in any case they change very slowly. North uses the example of the Russian Revolution: even though it is most likely the most radical and sudden social change ever experienced, there is still much of Tsarist Russia in its contemporary society, after the Soviet regime came and left. Tocqueville made the same observation about the French Revolution in his masterful ´The Ancient Regime and Revolution´: France ended up with an Emperor and several kings after the republican bloodshed and well into the XIXth Century, and social change came about slowly.
By generating winners and losers, institutions create ´path dependence´. Even when it is clear that change is needed, those who profit from the status quo (the rich and powerful), will stop or obstruct change. North puts forth the case of the Americas, the Anglosaxon and the Hispanic, to illustrate how, in spite of the fact that many Latin American nations practically copied the American Constitution after achieving independence, the heritage of the decadent and stagnant Spain persists to this day in their instititutions.
This is easily one of the most relevant books to read when trying to understand the world´s economy (crisis and all). As a further example, although it looks like China has changed overnight, it is most likely that´s not the case in institutional terms, and soon China will face the dead weight of its culture versus economic progress. Change does happen, and there may be some kickstarters, but in the long run institutions change in an incremental and slow way.. And summed up by saying Economics goes back to common sense and history. Currently Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) has an overall rating of 8 over 10.
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Cambridge University Press claimed Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organizations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)
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